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Is there evidence that competition in healthcare is a
good thing? No
Simon Stevens (doi:10.1136/bmj.d4136) argues that, used properly, competition can improve NHS
services, but Nicholas Mays thinks the existing evidence is unclear
Nicholas Mays professor of health policy
Department of Health Services Research and Policy, London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, London WC1H 9SH, UK
The coalition government’s approach to competition in the
English NHS represents a shift to a more systematic attempt to
organise the NHS along the line of the former publicly owned
utilities. There is to be supplier competition both in the market
(providers seeking individual patients) and for the market
(commissioners selecting providers for services to populations).1
But the market for tax financed, largely free at the point of use
healthcare provided by strongly regulated professionals differs
markedly from, for instance, the gas and telecommunications
markets. Not only is public healthcare the subject of intense
public and political concern, the quality of much care is difficult
for users to assess, and most of the time patients are dependent
on the doctor to act as their agent. As a result, standard market
theory produces ambiguous predictions of the likely effect of
competition.
A recent review of international evidence on the effect of
supplier competition in healthcare concluded that it is complex
and equivocal.2 It is also challenging to implement and regulate
competition, generating considerable transaction costs.
Competition is clearly easier to apply to services such as elective
surgery or routine diagnostics that are episodic, are relatively
easier to define, and have outcomes that are more
straightforward to assess. Competition between providers is
also likely to have more predictably desirable effects when
prices are set under a prospective payment system (such as the
NHS payment by results system)3 rather than when they are
allowed to vary.
UK evidence
Until recently, almost all the evidence about the effect of
hospital competition came from the very different context of
the United States. However, there is growing research on the
effect of Labour’s reforms to the English NHS which allowed
elective patients to choose their hospital. The research has been
widely interpreted as showing that the policy, backed by
information on quality of care, stimulated competition between
hospitals and that the quality and efficiency of care improved
more quickly in the more competitive parts of the country,
thereby saving lives.4 5
The headline finding of two independent studies that more
competition resulted in lower 30 day mortality for acute
myocardial infarction requires an explanation. Some of the same
researchers have shown that hospitals in more competitive
markets seemed to be better managed.6 It was also explained
on the grounds that the introduction of free choice of hospital
had allowed patients, especially sicker ones, to go to the better
hospitals, thereby improving outcomes.4
So how much weight should be placed on this evidence, and
should it guide future NHS policy? My answer is that it should
be interpreted more cautiously than it has been to date. The
effects of hospital competition after the introduction of patient
choice were small. For instance, a one standard deviation
increase in themeasures of competition was generally associated
with only a 0.2-0.3% greater reduction in acute myocardial
infarction death rates than might otherwise have been
expected.4 5 Some of the difference seems to have been due to
falls in mortality slowing in the less competitive markets after
2006 rather than improving performance in themore competitive
areas.4 In addition, the productivity gains associated with patient
choice and competition would contribute little to achieving the
large improvements needed by the NHS to sustain services in
the new tough financial environment.
Furthermore, the studies rely on hospital episode statistics,
which limits the assessment of quality to indicators such as
death and meticillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus infection
rates. It cannot be assumed that the improvement in survival
applies to other aspects of quality. The authors claim that
mortality from myocardial infarction is a good indicator of
overall hospital and emergency department performance on the
grounds that the facilities used to treat it are common to other
hospital services,5 yet there is no evidence for this assertion.
Hospital episode statistics are also known to lack data on case
severity, and coding of comorbidity is variable.7 This hampers
risk adjustment, which is essential when comparing hospitals.
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Although there has been much discussion of the potential
benefits of further opening up the English NHS to private
providers on the back of these analyses, private entry to the
NHSmarket was not responsible for the effects identified since
it was small scale during the study period (2002-8). Without
knowing more about how and why the 2006 introduction of
patient choice of elective provider should have had a positive
effect on death rates among emergency admissions within one
to two years, it is difficult to know how to advise policy makers
for the future.
Despite these caveats, the two key studies are econometrically
sophisticated and have used the introduction of full patient
choice in 2006 to generate a quasi-experimental test of the effect
of competition. They also attempt to control for a range of
possible confounding factors—such as the gradual introduction
of cardiac networks and primary angioplasty from 2001.5
Their findings suggest that hospital markets were associated
with a modest reduction in death rates from myocardial
infarction during a period when hospital incomes were rising
rapidly, but they do not show that this effect will persist in more
straightened financial circumstances8 or when applied to other
services that were not in the payment by results system. If
competition in the English NHS market is to be extended, it
should be done gradually, be accompanied by provision of good
information on the quality of care provided at different hospitals,
and have its effects assessed.
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